we don’t choose with whom we relate. Or of the difficulty of thinking the plurality.

It would not be strange that once read the statement that titles this entry, the reader reacts by thinking of denying such a claim: Thinking that ‘ how could it not depend on me, does my will has no say about my relationships?’ or extrañándose before the estimated implication of ‘and what, then, is another who depends on with whom I interact?’. Both reactions proceed, ultimately, forgetfulness of the plural character, social, of the social relations -and it is that memory that makes it necessarily true the assertion of the title.

The existence, and character, of a social relationship depends on the actions of both actors (let’s assume, for the sake of simplicity, a dual relationship). Which means, then, that does not depend on any of them separately. In fact, it is contradictory to the idea that each person who chooses with whom it relates. If this is so, then the relationship between A and B depends on A. But as the statement is general, so if you only depend on A, then no longer depends on B, and then the sentence is no longer true in relation to B (it is not true that B chooses with whom to relate, given that her relationship with A does not depend on B).

Suppose the case that A and B are in the relationship and decides To break the relationship. But this is simply not just the process. If B is interested in, then you will take action; and those actions in turn produce reactions in A. B can insist on communicating, or search for information to maintain the relationship, and then To seek to evade it, or to accept the communication that you do not want to have etc, let us Suppose, then, that To insist on evade, but that escape is a form of relationship. Even more so, and this clearly shows the character of the social life, the relationship does not correspond to the desires of no one (wants that does not exist, B will hold; but what there is is a leak), but the actions of each one are still scarred by the actions of the other.

It can be said that there are cases where this decision is in the hands of an actor. Suppose that a decides To break the relationship, and B has no how to react, or their reactions don’t affect to a: Not have the ability to insist (say, To have the means to avoid it so they don’t affect your own life). But this situation again depends on the relationship between A and B ( vis-a-vis To, that it is the case that B does not have the capability to influence). Again, what happens to a particular action, depends on the nature of the relationship between A and B, not for each subject separately.

At the same time, and this is crucial to understand what that implies plurality, what happens in the relationship if either does not follow directly from the actions of any actor, cannot be understood without the agency of them. Returning to our example of avoidance: it Is true that any actor you want to do this, but the situation can be understood only from the combination of both agencies (the will to avoid, the willingness to seek).

It is always much easier, finally, to think in terms monológicos: Think about the agency from the point of view of a single actor. The traditional opposition between action and structure is based on this: what is beyond the agency of an actor in particular appears as a structure (which is also a single thing). Think in terms of plurals, of several agencies, it is more complex. It implies, finally, realize that it does not exist agency, even in the most non-stops exist pure agency, by the fact that the world does not conform to one’s own will. But that involves actually thinking that the other is an other (an alter ego) and not a thing, a means to one’s own action. The model monológico of the instrumental action, for whom -what we have said in other entries– the other is a thing, does not cease to be extended and the underlying, even when we think to criticize.

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